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Abstract
This paper documents a robust empirical regularity: in the long-run, higher trade
openness is causally associated to a lower structural rate of unemployment. We es-
tablish this fact using: (i) panel data from 20 OECD countries, (ii) cross-sectional
data on a larger set of countries. The time structure of the panel data allows to deal
with endogeneity concerns, whereas cross-sectional data make it possible to instru-
ment openness by its geographical component. In both setups, we carefully purge
the data from business cycle eﬀects, include a host of institutional and geographical
variables, and control for within-country trade. Our main ﬁnding is robust to various
deﬁnitions of unemployment rates and openness measures. The preferred speciﬁcation
suggests that a 10 percent increase in total trade openness reduces unemployment by
about one percentage point. Moreover, we show that openness aﬀects unemployment
mainly through its eﬀect on TFP and that labor market institutions do not appear to
condition the eﬀect of openness.
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1 Introduction
Does exposure to international trade create or destroy jobs? In the short run, trade lib-
eralization increases job turnover as workers are reallocated from shrinking to expanding
sectors.1 Empirical evidence suggests that those adjustments temporarily raise frictional
unemployment on the aggregate level, as documented by Treﬂer (2004) for the case of
NAFTA. On the other hand, the long run eﬀect of trade liberalization on the equilibrium
rate of unemployment is less clear.2
A burgeoning literature introduces labor market imperfections into workhorse mod-
els of international trade. Most papers conclude that trade openness matters for the
equilibrium rate of unemployment; however, the sign of the relationship diﬀers across pa-
pers. Blanchard (2006) talks about an overabundance of theories of wage setting and
unemployment. Interacted with diﬀerent explanations for international trade (compara-
tive advantage versus product diﬀerentiation models), the number of possible theoretical
frameworks is large. Brecher (1974) and Davis (1998) incorporate minimum wages into
Heckscher-Ohlin models and ﬁnd that trade liberalization can exacerbate unemployment.
Davidson and Matusz (1988, 1999) introduce frictional unemployment in models of com-
parative advantage and ﬁnd that the sign of the relationship depends on a comparison of
capital-labor endowments across countries. Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) introduce fair
wages into a model with increasing returns to scale and ﬁnd that trade liberalization in-
creases unemployment. Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2008) introduce search frictions
into a similar trade model and ﬁnd that unemployment is likely to be decreasing in the
degree of openness. Helpman and Itshoki (2008) also use the search-matching approach,
but combine comparative advantage motives and increasing returns to scale. They ﬁnd
that globalization can increase unemployment.3
The state of the theoretical literature therefore suggests to turn towards an empirical
assessment. As stated by Davidson and Matusz (2004), whether trade aﬀects the level of
equilibrium unemployment is primarily an empirical issue . Yet, there is very little em-
pirical work on the aggregate employment eﬀects of trade policies  . This paper attempts
to shed some light on this question. Rather than testing a speciﬁc theoretical model, it
1See Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) for a recent paper.
2Paul Krugman (1993) famously argues that ... the level of employment is a macroeconomic issue,
depending in the short run on aggregate demand and depending in the long run on the natural rate of
unemployment, with microeconomic policies like tariﬀs having little net eﬀect. However, theoretical con-
siderations, as well as empirical evidence suggest that at least some microeconomic policiessuch as product
market regulationdo aﬀect the structural rate of unemployment; see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) for
the theoretical argument and Bassanini and Duval (2006) for a survey of the empirics.
3The theoretical literature is large and quickly growing; our short summary cannot be but a very
incomprehensive list of papers.
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presents the results of a thorough quest for the causal relationship between the rate of
unemployment and openness in cross-sections of countries. There are two important chal-
lenges on the way. First, published data on unemployment rates are notoriously unreliable,
with measurement bias systematically related to determinants of unemployment. More-
over, good data on labor market regulation is available only for a few countries. Second,
the incentive for politicians to erect trade barriers as a response to unemployment shocks,
may introduce a negative spurious correlation between unemployment and openness. If the
timing of trade liberalization and labor market reform coincide, domestic demand shocks
will concurrently reduce unemployment and increase imports.
We tackle the data quality problem by focusing on two diﬀerent samples. We start
with a high-quality data set of 20 rich OECD countries, provided by Bassanini and Duval
(2009). Great eﬀorts have been made at the OECD to construct unemployment rates and
indicators of various labor market institutions with meaningful time and cross-sectional
variance. In a second step, we use a lower-quality cross-section of countries, for which
we average yearly unemployment rates from various data sets such as provided by the
World Bank, the International Labor Organization, the International Monetary Fund, or
the CIA and draw on labor market variables provided by Botero et al. (2004). To avoid
endogeneity problems, we do our best to purge the data from business cycle eﬀects and we
use a comprehensive set of variables to control for labor market institutions. To address
simultaneity bias in the OECD panel, we use various GMM-based techniques and exploit
the time dimension of the data to construct instruments. In the cross-section, we use the
geographical component of trade openness as an instrument.
Across diﬀerent econometric models, diﬀerent speciﬁcations, and diﬀerent data sources,
we are able to ﬂesh out an important and robust result: the structural rate of unem-
ployment is a non-increasing function of openness to trade. In the largest share of our
regressions, higher trade openness actually decreases unemployment. In some exercises,
it is irrelevant but never turns out to be positively correlated with unemployment. We
ﬁnd the following additional results. (i) There is no evidence that the eﬀect of openness
on unemployment is biased upwards due to endogeneity. Quite to the contrary, we ﬁnd
that OLS yields a negative bias, which signals that attenuation bias due to non-systematic
measurement error in the openness measure (which biases results to zero) dwarves the en-
dogeneity bias. (ii) Controlling for endogeneity is nevertheless crucial when comparing the
eﬀects of import openness with that of export openness. OLS-type models overestimate (in
absolute values) the eﬀect of import openness, but underestimate that of export openness.
This is an interesting result that is fully in line with intuition: policy makers may react
to adverse labor market shocks by restricting imports and by promoting exports. Hence,
the correlation between the shock and the openness is negative for imports and positive
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for exports, leading to a positive bias in the ﬁrst instant and a negative one in the sec-
ond. (iii) It is important to adjust the openness measures for diﬀerences in the relative
prices of non-traded goods, as suggested by Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) in the context of
cross-country growth regressions. In particular, the unadjusted openness measure tends to
exaggerate the eﬀect of openness on unemployment.4 (iv) We investigate potential chan-
nels through which openness may aﬀect the rate of unemployment. The strongest one is
through total factor productivity (TFP). Openness increases TFP, as is well known in the
growth literature. In turn, TFP has a strong negative eﬀect on the rate of unemployment.
For other channelsthe capital/labor ratio, the degree of labor market distortions, or the
amount of product market competitionwe do not obtain clear-cut results over samples
and speciﬁcations. (v) We do not ﬁnd that the eﬀect of openness is strongly and robustly
conditioned by the capital/labor ratio, or the extent of labor or product market regulation.
Related literature. Apart from the theoretical literature discussed above, our exercise
is closely related to two important strands of empirical research. First, labor economists
have long estimated cross-country unemployment regressions, usually based on panel data
for a restricted sample of rich OECD countries. Following Blanchard and Wolfers' (2000)
seminal paper, the literature is mainly concerned with the explanatory power of labor
market institutions and macroeconomic shocks. Nickell et al. (2005) provide a recent
example of this approach, whereas Bassanini and Duval (2009) present a comprehensive
survey. The terms international trade, openness or globalization do not appear in their
comprehensive 130 pages study. Hence, it appears to us that the role of international trade
in cross-country regressions has not yet been thoroughly addressed.5 To connect our results
with previous research, we closely follow the received methodology since we use similar
data, econometric techniques and speciﬁcations. To the best of our knowledge, this paper
is the ﬁrst to systematically assess the role of trade openness for unemployment within
the context of standard cross-country unemployment regressions for OECD countries.6
Surprisingly enough, the inﬂuence of trade turns out to be much more robust than that of
many labor market institutions.
We also incorporate insights from the large empirical literature about the eﬀect of
4Note that this issue is of much less concern in our panel analysis, where we can eﬀectively control for
the time-invariant component of cross-country variation in relative prices.
5Scarpetta (1996) uses an index measuring the pervasiveness of trade restrictions to proxy the intensity
of competition. One also should add that many papers interact terms-of-trade shocks with labor market
variables. However, they do not use the level of openness as an independent covariate. Boulhol (2008)
interacts trade openness with labor market institutions, but does not address the endogeneity problem.
6The report of the European Economic Advisory Group at CESifo (2008) also includes some cross-
country regressions of unemployment rates on openness, but does not attempt to sort out correlation from
causality.
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trade openness on per capita income. Frankel and Romer (1999) have proposed an instru-
mentation strategy based on geography which is, as a matter of fact, applicable only in
cross-sections. The consensus is that the positive eﬀect of openness on per capita income is
not robust to seemingly unrelated geographical controls, such as the distance to equator.7
Their paper has triggered a debate on the relative importance of trade, institutions, and
the common underlying exogenous driver, geography. Prolonging this line of investigation,
a recent paper by Dutt et al. (2009) test speciﬁc implications of the Davidson and Matusz
(1999) model using cross-country regressions and a geography-based instrument. Although
their sample, data sources and methodology are diﬀerent, their results are qualitatively in
line with ours. Interestingly, our own IV estimates, much inspired by the approach of
Alcalá and Cicone (2004), suggest a negative relationship between openness and unem-
ployment that is robust to inclusion of variables such as distance to equator or general
institutional controls.
Structure of the paper. In section 2 we provide a brief ﬁrst glance at the data. We
identify our two key concerns about data quality and endogeneity bias. This motivates
section 3, where we sketch the empirical strategy for our diﬀerent data sets. Section 4
contains our core results on the trade-unemployment relation. We provide evidence for a
high-quality OECD panel with relatively narrow country coverage, a larger cross-section of
countries, and a short-panel with a greater number of countries. We contrast import and
export openness, and compare the real measure proposed by Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) to
the traditional one used, e.g., in Frankel and Romer (1999). Section 5 presents additional
results on the channels through which openness aﬀects labor markets and on interactions
between labor market institutions, the capital-labor ratio, and trade. It also discusses
a large number of robustness checks with the details relegated to a supplement paper.8
Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 A descriptive look at the data
As a ﬁrst step, this section discusses the data that we use in our empirical exercise: unem-
ployment rates and diﬀerent measures of openness to international trade. It also provides
a ﬁrst heuristic look at the unemployment-openness relationship. A detailed discussion of
the data is contained in the Appendix.
7See, for example, Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000.
8The supplement paper, do ﬁles, and our data are available at
http://sites.google.com/site/gfelberm.
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2.1 Data sources and variables
2.1.1 Unemployment rates
International institutions such as the OECD, the World Bank or the International Labor
Organization (ILO) provide harmonized unemployment rates that are calculated following
the same conventions. Across diﬀerent international institutions, these rules can diﬀer. For
example, the rates published by the OECD or the World Bank rely on national administra-
tive sources, while the ILO data is based on labour market surveys. The former strategy
presupposes the cooperation of national statistical agencies; the latter is probably better
suited to developing countries. Country coverage is always an issue: While the World Bank
has 185 members, in the year 2000 it reports unemployment rates only for 93 of them. The
ILO data exhibits an ever lower degree of country coverage (86 countries).
However, in all cases the accuracy of the published rates depends on the quality of the
data delivered by the institutions' member states. Data quality is only a minor issue for the
20 rich OECD countries, but appears to be highly problematic for the rest of the world.9
The correlation between unemployment rates from these diﬀerent data sets is strikingly low
within the group of low-income, low-openness countries, which suggests that data quality
systematically depends on country characteristics. Such non-random measurement error in
our dependent variable (the rate of unemployment), however, will tend to bias the absolute
value of the estimated eﬀect of openness upwards.
Unfortunately, there is very little that one can do about data quality problems except
running as many robustness checks as possible or working with the small panel of OECD
countries for which data quality is satisfactory.10 Hence, in a ﬁrst step, we focus on
20 high-quality OECD countries, for which systematic measurement bias in the rate of
unemployment is unlikely (but where the analysis may suﬀer from non-random sample
selection). This choice strongly limits the cross-sectional scope of our analysis and makes
it necessary to use panel data and rely on time-variance for estimation. In addition, we
perform purely cross-sectional regressions with larger country samples and also experiment
with a short panel for this larger sample. To verify the robustness of our results, we use
diﬀerent data sources for the dependent variable (unemployment rate).
9In its statistical factbook, the CIA publishes yearly estimates of unemployment rates for a larger
sample of countries (as of 2000, there is data for 160 countries). The CIA makes use of all publicly
available information plus the insider information of its employees. How exactly the CIA experts obtain
these estimates is not made explicit. In the non-OECD sample, average CIA estimates are substantially
larger than the information provided by oﬃcial sources; in the OECD sample there is no such gap.
10More details on countries included is provided in the Appendix.
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2.1.2 Openness measures
The summary measure of trade openness nearly always used in empirical work is nominal
imports plus exports relative to nominal GDP, usually referred to as (trade) openness and
denoted by T . For recent examples see Coe and Helpman (1995), Frankel and Romer's
(1999), Ades and Glaeser (1999), Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000), Dinopoulos and
Thompson (2000) or Alcalá and Ciccone (2004). The openness measure has the advantage
that it reﬂects the actual exposure of an economy to international trade and is easily
measurable. Trade policy itself is often hard to observe, in particular because of the
declining importance of tariﬀs or quotas and the increasing use of informal trade barriers.
Also, membership in regional trade agreements or the WTO does not necessarily provide
information about the actual openness of an economy, see Rose (2005).
There are some obvious alternatives to the standard deﬁnition of T that may be relevant
in the openness-unemployment debate. First, since imports and exports need not coincide,
and rising imports may have a diﬀerent eﬀect on unemployment than increasing exports,
one could redeﬁne T as nominal imports or exports over nominal GDP. Second, Alcalá and
Ciccone (2004) argue that the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect distorts nominal price openness
measures since countries with low labor productivity and hence a high price of traded
relative to non-traded goods have artiﬁcially high degrees of openness. They propose to
use real openness deﬁned as imports plus exports in exchange rate US$ relative to GDP
in purchasing-power-parity US$ (PPP GDP). This eliminates cross-country diﬀerences in
the relative price of non-traded services from the summary measure of trade. They show
how the real openness measure can be computed using data provided in the Penn World
Tables (PWT). The measure of real openness may be particularly relevant to the extent
that the eﬀect of trade openness on aggregate unemployment works through total factor
productivity. We use real total trade openness constructed according to Alcalá and Ciccone
(2004) as our benchmark measure. Even if accounting for the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect is
not a big issue for countries in our OECD sample, the problem becomes more severe in
our large cross sectional regressions. Comparing real and current price openness measures
reveals that the eﬀect is smaller for real openness but coeﬃcients are more stable across
diﬀerent models and setups.11
As with unemployment rates, the openness measures may be noisy proxies for the
actual degree of exposure to international trade. However, it is less obvious that measure-
ment error should be systematically related to any determinant of the unemployment rate.
11In our robustness checks, we also work with constant price openness measures which ﬁx all prices at
some base year. Moreover, data provided by the World Bank allows to focus on merchandize trade only.
This allows to see whether trade in services has a diﬀerent eﬀect on unemployment compared to trade in
goods.
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Random measurement error would bias estimated towards zero, making it harder for us
to ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects. The real challenge therefore lies in the potential endogeneity of
openness to adverse labor market shocks.
2.1.3 Labor market institutions
The OECD has collected data on a wide array of institutional variables that can be expected
to aﬀect the equilibrium rate of unemployment. Bassanini and Duval (2009) discuss the
data in detail. These measures include the degree of union density or of union coverage,
the extent of employment protection legislation or of active labor market policies, eﬀective
average tax rates on wages, the average replacement rate of unemployment insurance, the
degree of corporatism and many more. The data also includes a measure of product market
regulation which reﬂects entry barriers. These variables are available for 20 rich OECD
countries, and for most of them we have time series ranging from 1980 - 2003.
The data for the wider cross-section of countries is more problematic. By far the most
careful data collection has been undertaken by Botero et al. (2004). They provide a
data set containing data on various aspects of labor market regulations for 85 countries.
Observations range from 1990 - 2000 and were averaged over the whole period. In our
study we focus on measures related to the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts, the extent
of employment protection (EPL) and the importance of minimum wages. Additionally
to those labor market regulations Botero et al. also collected data on the size of the
informal economy. Reported unemployment rates and the degree of openness may both
be systematically related to the size of the shadow economy so that omitting this variable
could easily bias the eﬀect of trade. This is a particularly important issue in the large
cross-section, where we cannot control for unobserved heterogeneity and where we have a
large number of developing countries.
The Botero et al. data does not contain a time dimension. Therefore, when running
panel regressions for the large country sample, we need to rely on data from the Fraser
Freedom of the world data base, where we have variables on unemployment beneﬁts, labor
market institutions and product market regulations. The former variable is an index that
collects information on many dimensions of labor market institutions; the latter quantiﬁes
the extent of price controls.12 Observations for 116 countries are available in ﬁve year
intervals beginning in 1975 and ranging until 2005.
12In the original Fraser data higher values indicate more freedom and thus less regulation. To avoid
confusion when comparing with the OECD or the Botero et al. data we rescale the Fraser variables by the
factor −1.
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2.2 A ﬁrst glance at the openness-unemployment nexus
2.2.1 Time variance in the OECD sample.
The solid line in Figure 1 plots the unweighted average unemployment rate of 20 rich OECD
countries (see the Appendix for a list of countries). Starting from a low level at about 2
percentage points in 1970, the unemployment rate increased over time to reach a peak of
10 percent in the mid-nineties, but fell back to about 6 percent in 2003. Not surprisingly,
the unemployment rate exhibits substantial cyclical variation. Measured on the right
vertical axis of Figure 1, the unweighted average share of trade in total GDP (measured
as real openness) also displays a clear upward trend: it increased from about 25 percent in
1970 to about 40 percent in the early years of the new millennium. The trade share also
displays cyclical variation, albeit at a smaller degree. Hence, in the OECD sample, average
unemployment rates and the average real openness appear positively correlated over time.
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Figure 2: Unemployment and wage dis-
tortion
So far, the empirical labor market literature has usually not accounted for any measure
of trade openness. Nickell et al. (2005) show that the evolution of labor market institutions
has substantial explanatory power for unemployment rates. In particular, tax rates and
replacement rates perform well; other institutional variables do not yield robust results.
This is not entirely surprising since the theoretical predictions relating to employment pro-
tection legislation or union coverage are usually ambiguous. Costain and Reiter (2008) use
a theoretical model to argue that tax and replacement rates should have similar qualitative
and quantitative eﬀects in a search and matching model of unemployment. They propose
to add them. The obtained index consists of the sum of the average wage tax burden and
social beneﬁts foregone when a worker switches from unemployment into a job. It therefore
measures the total ﬁscal burden imposed on the worker (see also Saez (2002); Immervoll et
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al. (2007)) and is sometimes referred to as the participation tax. Figure 2 shows that the
average wedge and average unemployment are also positively correlated over time. Hence,
the prima facie evidence suggests that it is important to control for both variables in any
meaningful cross-country unemployment regression that draws on time variance.13
Figures 1 and 2 present sample averages over time and fully disregard heterogeneity
across countries. In a next step we correlate ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the real openness measure
against ﬁrst-diﬀerences in the unemployment rate. Diﬀerencing should eliminate country-
speciﬁc eﬀects unrelated to openness that may drive the correlation in Figure 1. Figure 3
shows the scatter plot and ﬁts a univariate linear regression. The slope of the line is esti-
mated at −0.04 with a t-value of 5.69. This preliminary evidence points towards a negative
eﬀect of trade openness on the rate of unemployment. A one-standard deviation increase
(about 10 percentage points) of openness is associated to a decrease in the rate of unem-
ployment of about 0.4 percentage points. Interestingly, our more elaborate multivariate
instrumental variable analysis below suggests results of very similar magnitude.
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Figure 3: Unemployment and trade openness: ﬁrst diﬀerences (OECD sample)
2.2.2 Cross-sectional variance in the large sample
Figure 4 sets the average level of unemployment (WDI estimates) against the average level
of openness (real current price) for the largest cross-section of countries, for which we have
13In the picture, the unemployment rate leads the measure of wage distortion over time. Costain and
Reiter (2008) discuss the endogeneity issues suggested by this fact but conclude that they are unlikely to
pose any serious problems.
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data. Averages are based on the period from 1990-2006, but there may be substantial
spans of missing values within that period.
The linear regression line ﬁtted to the scatter plot has a slope of about -0.044 with
a t-value of 2.20.14 Hence, also in the large cross-section of countries, the unconditional
regression of openness on the rate of unemployment yields a negative correlation. Because
the variance of the openness measure is much larger in the large cross-section than in the
narrow OECD sample, the point estimate implies that a one-standard deviation increase
of openness is associated to a decrease in the rate of unemployment by about 1 percentage
point.
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Figure 4: Unemployment and trade openness: averaged levels (large cross-section)
2.3 Implications and challenges
The above ﬁgures are suggestive. However, they cannot establish a causal relationship.
There are several reasons why the correlations in ﬁgures 3 and 4 may be spurious. First,
while we have used yearly data, there may be business cycle eﬀects: any positive shock on
domestic spending is likely to increase domestic as well as import demand. This lowers
unemployment and increases openness. Second, in periods of reform, countries may simul-
taneously liberalize their product and labor markets, leading to a simultaneous increase in
openness and employment. Third, politicians may react to shocks in the unemployment
rate by imposing protectionist measures. More precisely, they may resort to policy mea-
sures that discourage imports and encourage exports; since the overt use of tariﬀs, quotas,
14The ﬁnding of a negative slope is robust to the exclusion of HKG (Hong Kong) and SGP (Singapore);
statistical ﬁt is improved by taking logs of both variables.
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or subsidies is strongly restricted by international agreements, governments may use non-
tariﬀ measures which are diﬃcult to control for directly. In the case that import-restricting
policies dominate, the rise in unemployment would be associated with a reduction in open-
ness.
We deal with the ﬁrst problem, the business-cycle eﬀect, in the following way. In the
OECD sample, we take 5-year averages to smooth out business cycle variation. Moreover,
in all regressions we include a measure of the output gap, based on HP ﬁltering methods,
and provided by Bassanini and Duval (2009). In the larger cross-section, we take averages
over the entire available period (1990-2006). We also include the output gap.
The second issue relates to an omitted variables bias. In the OECD sample, we can
draw on high-quality data provided by Bassanini and Duval (2009). For the wider sample,
we use the variables provided by Botero et al. (2004). See the Appendix for a detailed
description of all our data.
The third and most interesting problem is a classical simultaneity problem. We can only
address it by instrumenting the openness measures. In the case of the OECD panel, we can
exploit the time-variance of the data and use lagged diﬀerences and levels as instruments.
In the case of the wider cross-section, we draw on the instrument proposed by Frankel and
Romer (1999) and used, i.a., by Alcalá and Ciccone (2004). We have opposite expectations
concerning the sign of the endogeneity bias for import openness and export openness. This
provides us with a natural external check of our instrumentation strategy.
3 Empirical strategy
We have to adapt our econometric strategy to the nature of the available data. For the
OECD sample, where we can draw on meaningful time-variance, we build on the rich
tradition of empirical labor market studies surveyed in Bassanini and Duval (2009) and
use panel methods. For the wider sample, we use the cross-sectional approach which
has been widely employed in the growth-openness literature. While time-variance in the
larger cross-section is somewhat problematic, we still check our results by running panel
regressions as well.
3.1 OECD sample: GMM panel regressions
We extend Nickell et al. (2005) and estimate variants of a dynamic model
ui,t =
S∑
s=1
ρsui,t−s + β · Ti,t + λ · LMIi,t + pi ·PMRi,t + γ ·GAPi,t + νi + νt + εi,t, (1)
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where S is the number of lags of the endogenous variables. All variables are ﬁve-year aver-
ages. The vectors LMIi,t andPMRi,t collect variables measuring labor market institutions
and product market regulation, respectively. GAPi,t is the output gap,
15 νi is a vector of
country-speciﬁc eﬀects, νt denotes time eﬀects, and εi,t is an error term. We are primarily
interested in the estimate of β and expect that the eﬀects of LMI and PMR conform with
the evidence surveyed in Bassanini and Duval (2009). This evidence is mixed: Baker et
al. (2004) show that those panel data estimations lack robustness and that clear results
on the role of most labor market institutions hardly exist. There is, however, an emerg-
ing consensus that replacement rates and the tax wedge have a robust and theoretically
sensible eﬀect; see Costain and Reiter (2008).
The (preferred) equation estimated by Nickell et al. (2005) is similar to (1), but does
not include openness. They use generalized least squares techniques on this equation
and are not particularly worried by the potential endogeneity of labor or product market
institutions. Many of the speciﬁcations surveyed in Bassanini and Duval (2009) constrain
ρs = 0 and estimate static ﬁxed eﬀects models. Some papers use the log of ui,t as the
dependent variable (Nickell, 1997; Costain and Reiter, 2008), but there does not seem any
consensus as to which speciﬁcation is preferred. In our baseline speciﬁcations, we use ui,t
in levels, but provide robustness checks for the logarithmic case.
We address the potential endogeneity of openness and of the lagged dependent vari-
able by instrumenting with the respective lagged values.16 In the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced general
method of moments (diﬀ-GMM) approach by Arellano and Bond (1991), all variables are
diﬀerenced and endogenous variables are instrumented by their lags (in diﬀerences). The
more general approach proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) adds level equations to the
diﬀerenced ones. This leads to a system of two diﬀerent sets of moment conditions (dif-
ferences and levels). Blundell and Bond use Monte Carlo simulations to show that the
sys-GMM approach is more eﬃcient since a larger number of moment conditions is avail-
able. All techniques discussed above allow to control for potential endogeneity, even when
there is no obvious instrument waiting on the wing. Nevertheless those GMM approaches
must be treated cautiously since small degrees of model speciﬁcation error may induce
large eﬀects on results and lagged variables might be weak instruments. There are how-
ever, a number of tests that can be used to check whether the conditions of the approach
are fulﬁlled. For both GMM methods, two requirements must hold: i) the instruments
15For the OECD output gap is measured as derivation of actual output from potential output (Basanini
and Duval (2009). For the large cross section we use a proxy constructed as diﬀerence between actual
GDP and trend GDP. The latter is obtained by HP-ﬁltering the data, where the smoothing parameter is
set to 400.
16Additionally, we treat the wage distortion index (sum of average replacement rate and tax wedge) as
endogenous.
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must be uncorrelated with the error term and ii) the instruments must be correlated with
the instrumented variable. Both types of GMM are valid if we ﬁnd evidence in favor of
ﬁrst order, but against second order auto correlation in the residuals.17
3.2 Large cross-section of countries: 2SLS regressions
To extend the analysis beyond the 20 rich OECD countries, we focus on a pure cross-
section of countries. This approach is strongly related to cross-country income regressions
(Frankel and Romer, 1999; Alcalá and Ciccone, 2004), with the most important diﬀerence
being the diﬀerent choice of dependent variable.
We estimate the following second stage regression
ui = α+ β · Ti + λ · LMIi + pi ·PMRi + δ ·GEOi + ι · INSTi + γ ·GAPi + εi, (2)
which includes the same type of controls than (1). Since we have no reliable time-variance
available to control for unobserved country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, we have to add geograph-
ical variables to control for the size of the home-market and hence the importance of
within-country trade as compared to international trade. Frankel and Romer (1999) and
much of the following literature use the log of population and the log of land area of coun-
try i.18 Regressions also contain a continuous measure of landlockedness as an additional
strictly exogenous control. We proxy for the overall quality of institutions by including
distance to the equator and continent dummies.
We follow Frankel and Romer (1999) and instrument Ti by its (exogenous) geographical
component; however, our strategy is somewhat more general. It consists in using bilateral
trade data (for the year of 2000) and regress total trade (exports plus imports) between
country i and j, normalized by country i′s GDP, on geographical determinants of trade in
an equation of the type
Tij = exp
[
ϕXij
]
· υij . (3)
The vector X contains the log of bilateral distance between i and j, the log of population
of i and j as of year 1960, the log of land area of i and j, and a continuous measure of
landlockedness. It also contains interactions of all those terms with an adjacency dummy.
All of the elements in X are exogenous while υij is an error term.
The standard procedure is to take logs of (3) and estimates the vector ϕ using OLS.
Since Tij = 0 for many country pairs, we follow Santos and Tenreyro (2006) and estimate
17We have also experimented with the Anderson and Hsiao approach where lagged variables are used as
instruments when estimating two stage least square IV regressions. Results are available on request.
18While standard in the related literature and crucial for the interpretation of the results, Dutt et al.
(2009) do not include these controls.
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(3) using Poisson pseudo maximum-likelihood. Predicting Tˆij and summing over j, we have
a measure of the trade share Tˆi that is by construction orthogonal to unemployment and
hence a valid instrument.19 The Poisson approach leads to a stronger instrument since we
do not have to omit the information contained in the zero trade observations and need not
resort to out-of-sample predictions to construct the instrument.20
3.3 Large sample: Panel regressions
In the setup described in section 3.2, we have averaged yearly available unemployment data
for a large set of countries into a cross-section. This seems appropriate to deal with business
cycle eﬀects and should also help to reduce (non-systematic) measurement error in both
the dependent and the independent variables. However, it is possible to generate averages
over shorter periods of time (ﬁve years), stack data from diﬀerent periods, and use panel
methods. The drawback of this approach is that unemployment data are available only for
a very small sample for a long time horizon so that we end up with a strongly unbalanced
panel. However, applying panel methods still allows to check the overall robustness of our
results in 3.2 to country-speciﬁc unobservable eﬀects.
We use the same econometric speciﬁcation than the one used on OECD data, see
equation (1). Since we need time-variant information about labor and product market
regulation, we cannot use the Botero et al. (2004) data, but have to work with variables
provided by the Fraser institute.
4 The eﬀect of openness on unemployment
In the following section, we present benchmark results for our diﬀerent samples, empirical
strategies and IV strategies. We also study the diﬀerent impact of export versus import
openness. The overall picture is fairly robust and surprisingly clear-cut: regardless of
the precise econometric model used, independent from the exact source of data or the
deﬁnition of the employed openness measure or the nature of controls we ﬁnd that higher
openness does not increase unemployment. In most regressions, openness strictly lowers
the equilibrium rate of unemployment. We are able to establish that our ﬁndings reﬂect
the causal eﬀect of openness on trade rather than spurious correlations.
19Note that validity of the instrument does not require that the coeﬃcients associated to X are con-
sistently estimated parameters of a gravity equation. Rather, equation (3) is a constructed exogenous
measure of multilateral resistance.
20Noguer and Siscart (2005) show that out-of-sample predictions has important adverse implications for
the strength of the instrument.
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4.1 Benchmark results
4.1.1 OECD sample: panel regressions
Table 1 presents panel regressions for 20 rich OECD countries. The dependent variable is
the rate of unemployment in the total working age population (age 15-64). All variables
are ﬁve-year averages ranging from 1980 - 2003.21 Robust standard errors are reported. A
list of countries used in these regressions is provided in the Appendix.
Columns (1) and (2) show standard regressions as carried out by Bassanini and Du-
val (2009). The ﬁrst treats country-eﬀects as ﬁxed, the second treats them as random,
everything else is equal. We let a Hausman test decide which of the two speciﬁcations is
preferred. In all cases presented in Table 1 the test recommends the random eﬀects (RE)
speciﬁcation over the ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) model.
The regressions reveal a well-known pattern: only a few labor market controls are
statistically signiﬁcant, and often the sign pattern seems to be counter-intuitive. The
toughness of ﬁring restrictions as reﬂected in employment protection legislation (EPL)
is negatively associated to the rate of unemployment. Hence, ﬁring restrictions seem to
discourage job destruction more than job creation; however, the eﬀect is not statistically
distinguishable from zero. Similarly, we do not ﬁnd any robust role for the degree of
union density. The degree of wage distortion (the sum of the replacement rate and the
average tax rate on wages) is positively related to the equilibrium unemployment rate.
Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, an increase in the wedge by 10 percentage points
increases the rate of unemployment by about 1 percentage point. Countries with a highly
corporatist bargaining culture have an unemployment rate that is by about 2.3 percentage
points lower than countries without this tradition. These ﬁndings are in line with the
literature,22 and the emerging consensus that the degree of wage distortion is the most
important institutional variable in panel regressions23.
Although we average our data over ﬁve-year intervals to mitigate business cycle con-
cerns, the output gap is strongly signiﬁcant and has the expected negative sign. This shows
that taking averages alone is not suﬃcient to purge out the business cycle. Also note that
country-speciﬁc eﬀects are important for the overall explanatory power of the model. A
model that explains unemployment only by country-eﬀects yields an R2 statistic of about
63%; adding year dummies improves the share of left-hand-side variance explained to 75%.
21We have also run regressions on yearly data. Results are similar and statistical signiﬁcance is usually
higher. However we prefere to work with averages to better account for variations in the business cycle.
22As can be seen from the survey by Bassanini and Duval (2009) or the critical discussion in Baker et
al. (2002).
23See Costain and Reiter (2008).
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In the random eﬀects model shown in column (2), the exact variance decomposition shows
that the within component is much larger than the between component.
Columns (3) and (4) include the real openness measure proposed by Alcalá and Ciccone
(2004) into the ﬁxed- and the random eﬀects models, respectively. Again, the Hausman test
recommends the more eﬃcient RE model. The results imply that an increase in openness by
10 percentage points lowers the equilibrium rate of unemployment by about 0.73 percentage
points. Inclusion of the openness measure increases the explanatory power (within R2)
of the regression by about 4 percentage points. Focusing on the RE speciﬁcation and
comparing the models with and without the openness measures, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients
on the labor market variables change only very slightly so that omitted variable bias from
not incorporating openness seems unimportant. This suggests that labor market regulation
does not systematically correlate with the degree of openness. Also the output gap does
not seem to covary with openness.
The remaining models presented in Table 1 are dynamic models. Column (5) uses the
feasible generalized least square methodology proposed by Nickel et al. (2005) to estimate
an autoregressive model.24 The lagged rate of unemployment has an estimated coeﬃcient of
about 0.37, signalling thatover our ﬁve-year periodsunemployment rates are only mildly
persistent, controlling for the output gap and labor market institutions. Again, the eﬀect
of openness is precisely estimated and negative. The short-run eﬀect together with the
autoregressive coeﬃcient implies that a ten percentage point increase in openness lowers
the equilibrium rate of unemployment by roughly one percentage point in the short-run,
and by about 1.5 percentage points in the long-run.25
So far we have not dealt with the potential endogeneity of openness. Models (6) and (7)
use lagged realizations or lagged diﬀerences of openness as instruments. In the ﬁrst case,
GMM estimation is applied to a diﬀerenced version of equation (1). In the second case,
moment conditions from an additional level equation are used to increase eﬃciency. In
both cases, we ﬁnd that openness reduces unemployment. In the diﬀ-GMM model (6), the
short-run eﬀect and the long-run eﬀects are quantitatively comparable to the FGLS model.
In the sys-GMM model (7), the short-run eﬀect is smaller: a 10 percentage points increase
in openness decreases unemployment by about 0.26 percentage points. The long run eﬀect,
however, is again comparable: a 10 percent openness increase leads to lower unemployment
by 1.16 points. GMM methods are vulnerable to misspeciﬁcation problems and applicable
only under certain conditions. For both models, the OID tests for overidentiﬁcation yield
high p-values so that validity of the instruments cannot be rejected.26 Furthermore, the
24Their approach includes country eﬀects into the regressions.
25Long-run coeﬃcients are found at the ﬁxed-point of the diﬀerence equation.
26Note that the tests remain stochastic (p-values <1) and consequently meaningful.
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Table 1: Benchmark regressions: OECD panel
Dependent variable: Total unemployment (16-64 years old)
Openness measure: Real openness (Alcala & Ciccone, 2004)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FE RE FE RE FGLS Diff-GMM Sys-GMM
Total trade openness −0.113∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗ −0.026∗∗
(0.037) (0.018) (0.023) (0.046) (0.011)
Lag dep. var. 0.367∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.153) (0.054)
Wage distortion (index) 0.134∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.054 0.061∗
(0.040) (0.026) (0.042) (0.025) (0.020) (0.042) (0.035)
EPL (index) −0.609 −0.642 −0.488 −0.533 −0.315 −0.516 −0.269
(1.187) (0.541) (1.185) (0.540) (0.357) (0.820) (0.429)
Union density (index) 0.043 −0.007 0.034 0.005 0.037∗∗ −0.001 −0.035∗∗
(0.033) (0.028) (0.034) (0.027) (0.016) (0.035) (0.016)
High corporatism (dummy) −2.620∗∗∗ −2.324∗∗∗ −1.299 −1.592∗∗ −1.605∗∗∗ −1.081 −1.030
(0.828) (0.730) (1.160) (0.702) (0.487) (1.058) (0.966)
Output gap (%) −0.596∗∗∗ −0.661∗∗∗ −0.611∗∗∗ −0.638∗∗∗ −0.626∗∗∗ −0.685∗∗∗ −0.709∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.114) (0.092) (0.112) (0.054) (0.080) (0.086)
R2 (within) 0.574 0.559 0.610 0.600
R2 (overall) 0.211 0.350 0.209 0.321
R2 (between) 0.121 0.274 0.094 0.220
Hausman 0.633 0.617
OID test 0.249 0.967
AR(1) 0.007 0.016
AR(2) 0.524 0.553
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Number
of observation N=100 (20 countries observed for 4 5-year periods and 1 4-year period; averages taken; 1980-2003).
Hausman test p-values reported (Fixed effects estimator always consistent; random effects estimator efficient
under Ho). All models control for unobserved country and period effects. FGLS allows for heteroscedastic errors
and country specific first order serial correlation. First lag of dependent variable used for Feasible Least Square
and Generalized Methods of Moments regressions. Diff- and Sys-GMM estimators are valid if i) OID test does
not reject the H0 (H0: overidentifying restrictions are valid) and ii) if test on AR(1) is positive and negative
on AR(2) (H0: no autocorrelation). Openness, output gap and wage distortion treated as endogenous in the
GMM regressions. Maximum number of lags used as instruments equals one (22 instruments for diff-GMM and
37 instruments for sys-GMM). Constant estimated but not reported.
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AR(1) and AR(2) statistics suggest that the model is not misspeciﬁed.
Comparing (long-run) estimates across diﬀerent columns of Table 1, we ﬁnd that the
point estimates of the openness coeﬃcient are typically larger under the IV strategy. This
is consistent with several explanations. First, the non-IV estimates may be biased down
(in absolute value) due to endogeneity bias. This would happen if governments respond to
adverse unemployment shocks by promoting exports such that total openness (reﬂecting
imports as well) goes up. A second possibility, which we pursue in detail in section 4.2,
is that the endogeneity biases of import openness and export openness are of opposite
signs and that they oﬀset each other in the measure of total openness. Third, the fact
that non-IV estimates are biased towards zero may arise when our openness indicator is a
noisy proxy of the true relevant degree of openness. Since instrumentation also remedies
measurement error, this may explain the observed sign of the bias.
We have also run versions of the regressions shown in Table 1 under two modiﬁcations.
Results are presented in the supplement paper (table 33). First, rather than using the total
wage distortion (sum of replacement rate and tax rate), it uses both variables separately.
Second, it adds a variable that has received much interest in the last years as a determinant
of unemployment, namely the degree of product market regulation (PMR).2728 Qualita-
tively and quantitatively, the results are robust. However, the longer list of covariates
makes it ever more diﬃcult to ascertain the right speciﬁcation of the GMM-sys estima-
tions (the OID test statistic becomes non-stochastic), so that we have opted for the more
parsimonious model in the body of the paper.
27See Felbermayr and Prat (2009) for theory and evidence on the role of PMR.
28We have also run regressions with the logarithm of population as an additional control. This variable
will be crucial in the cross-sectional exercise. It is, however, qualitatively and quantitatively unimportant
in the OECD panel exercise, most likely because the time variance of that variable is very low in that
sample. In order to improve the performance of GMM models, we have to keep the models parsimonious
enough, and therefore drop population.
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Moreover, the PMR indicator provided by the OECD partly reﬂects the degree of openness,
so that its inclusion is potentially redundant. In section 5.1, we will test whether higher
openness lowers unemployment precisely because it lowers the overall strictness of PMR.
4.1.2 Large sample: cross sections
Next, in Table 2, we study the eﬀect of real openness in a cross-section of 62 countries.
Unemployment rates are taken from the World Development Indicators data base provided
by the World Bank. We average all variables over the window 1990-2006, so that business
cycle eﬀects are unlikely to contaminate the results. However, we still control for the
output gap. We deal with endogeneity as described in section 3.2 by using an improved
Frankel and Romer (1999) - type instrumentation strategy.
Column (1) is the most parsimonious model. It uses no additional controls (except the
output gap whose inclusion is inconsequential). The OLS regression produces a coeﬃcient
of 0.047, estimated with high precision, and implying that a 10 percentage points increase
in openness lowers unemployment by about half a percentage point. When openness is
instrumented, the point estimate is close to zero and statistical signiﬁcance is lost. Hence,
it appears that, in this very parsimonious model, OLS strongly overestimates the absolute
size of the openness eﬀect.
Column (3) and (4) are virtually identical to Table IV in Alcalá and Ciccone (2004)
or to Table 3 in Frankel and Romer (1999), with the key diﬀerences being the diﬀerent
dependent variable and a slightly more general construction of the instrument. These pa-
pers stress the importance of including variables that control for the size of the domestic
market (logarithm of population, the logarithm of land area, and a continuous measure of
landlockedness). This is crucial since a country's degree of openness is negatively corre-
lated to its own economic size. As suggested by theoretical arguments based on economic
geography models, omitting the domestic market size control biases the openness coeﬃ-
cient away from zero if domestic market size is positively correlated to the unemployment
rate, and biases it towards zero if it is negatively correlated.29 The regressions also include
a rough proxy for institutional qualitythe logarithm of distance to the equator (latitude).
The IV estimate is now signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. It follows that the failure to
produce a signiﬁcant IV coeﬃcient in column (2) is not due to endogeneity bias, but rather
to omitted variable bias.
Models (5) and (6) add a variable provided by Botero et al. (2004), namely the size
of the unoﬃcial economy as a share of oﬃcially reported GDP. It is plausible to assume
29Assuming for simplicity that all covariates other than openness and domestic market size are uncorre-
lated, the bias is βsize × cov (open, size) /var(open).
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that more open economies have smaller unoﬃcial economies, since exporting or importing
requires formal clearing at the borders. It may also be the case that oﬃcially reported
unemployment rates are inversely proportional to the size of the shadow economy. Indeed,
in our data the discrepancy between estimates by the CIA and oﬃcial data correlates with
the size of the unoﬃcial economy. Hence, it seems meaningful to control for the extent of
the shadow economy. Compared to the results presented in columns (3) and (4), we ﬁnd
that this additional variable leaves the OLS estimates broadly unchanged but undoes the
statistical signiﬁcance of openness in the instrumental variable regressions. The size and
sign of the estimates hardly moves. This is, however, not a robust result. For example,
taking out latitude restores signiﬁcance. More importantly, even with latitude included,
we obtain fairly precise and roughly comparable estimates for both the OLS and the IV
regressions when the model is augmented by continent dummies. The latter may help to
further control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries.
Finally, models (9) and (10) are the most comprehensive in that they include a list
of labor market covariates provided by Botero et al. (2004). In particular, we use a
measure related to the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL), an index
related to unemployment beneﬁts, a variable indicating the existence of minimum wages
and a variable measuring non-wage costs of labor (i.e., taxes). With the exception of EPL,
none of those additional controls turns out signiﬁcant.
Summarizing, we ﬁnd that across most multivariate cross-sectional regressions, the
eﬀect of a 10 percentage points increase in openness lowers unemployment by about 1
percentage point (columns (8) and (10)). As with the high-quality OECD data, and
presumably for the same reasons, there is no robust evidence that OLS overestimates the
size of the true eﬀect. In particular, in the more complete speciﬁcation, it is hard to see
any diﬀerence between IV and OLS results.
4.1.3 Large sample: panel regressions
Table 3 runs panel regression of ﬁve-year averages on a larger set of countries. We employ
the same econometric speciﬁcations and use similar controls as in section 4.1.1. In particu-
lar, we control for the output gap in all speciﬁcations. This is important as taking ﬁve-year
averages does not seem to entirely purge business cycle eﬀects. We control for market size
changes by including the logarithm of population. The institutional labor market controls
are from the Fraser Institute and measure overall hiring and ﬁring restrictions and the re-
placement rate.30 We also use a measure of product market regulation from the same data
source. We do not have time-variant information about tax rates. Geographical variables
30The benchmark data from Botero et al. (2004) has not time dimension.
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and time-invariant institutional features are accounted for by country eﬀects.
The results conﬁrm the existence of a negative relation between real openness and the
rate of unemployment. More speciﬁcally, columns (1) and (2) show the ﬁxed (FE) and the
random eﬀects (RE) model. The Hausman test (p-value of 0.291) prefers random eﬀects.
This choice has important quantitative implications in the present setup since the openness
coeﬃcient is more than twice as large in the FE model than in the RE speciﬁcation. The
latter indicates that an increase of openness by 10 percentage points lowers unemployment
by about 0.78 percentage points. It is striking how close this latter eﬀect comes to our
cross-sectional results presented above.
The dynamic models (3) to (5) are problematic because the panel is strongly unbalanced
and the number of observations over time is very small for some countries. Interestingly,
in all dynamic models, the evidence for persistence in (ﬁve-year-averaged) unemployment
rates is fairly low and much smaller than in the case of the OECD sample where country
coverage is more homogenous and the panel is longer. The FGLS model signals a short-run
openness coeﬃcient close to the one obtained under FE in column (1); the long-run eﬀect
is almost identical. Diﬀ-GMM produces similar results; however, the OID test (p-value of
0.05) is unsatisfyingly low so that the instrumentation strategy is doubtful in this case.
The Sys-GMM model is more eﬃcient, and can make use of more observations. The OID
test and the other test statistics are ﬁne, so that we take the Sys-GMM results as the
most credible. Here, an increase in openness by 10 percentage points reduces equilibrium
unemployment by about 0.57 percentage points in the short-run and by 0.84 points in the
long run. Notice the quantitative similarity of these coeﬃcients with those obtained for
the smaller OECD sample discussed in section 4.1.1.
4.2 Exports versus imports
In the next step, we modify the benchmark regressions presented above. We substitute the
measure of total (gross) openness used above by import or export openness (deﬁned as real
openness measures according to Alcalá and Ciccone, 2004). We expect that endogeneity
concerns should bias the openness coeﬃcient more strongly away from zero for imports
than for exports. Moreover, by using export and import openness in the same equation,
we are able to make inference on the relative strength of these two measures.
Table 4 summarizes the results. In the upper panel of the table, each cell corresponds
to a separate regression where we only report the estimated coeﬃcient and the associated
robust standard error. The lower panel shows the results of one regression per column,
where both measures of openness are simultaneously included. The full regression output
is documented in the supplement paper. Each column corresponds to a diﬀerent sample
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Table 3: Benchmark regressions: large panel
Dependent variable: Total unemployment (WDI)
Openness measure: Real openness (Alcala & Ciccone, 2004)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FE RE FGLS Diff-GMM Sys-GMM
Total trade openness −0.223∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗ −0.057∗
(0.064) (0.020) (0.023) (0.075) (0.03)
Lag. dep. var. 0.106∗∗ 0.228∗ 0.319∗
(0.047) (0.130) (0.171)
Pop (ln) −5.337 −0.584∗ 5.202∗∗ −2.194 −0.635
(6.987) (0.306) (2.119) (1.544) (0.843)
LMR (index) 0.638∗ 0.448∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.414 0.660∗
(0.372) (0.248) (0.101) (0.323) (0.400)
Unemployment benefits (index) 0.077 0.128 0.210∗∗∗ 0.086 0.110
(0.160) (0.141) (0.044) (0.163) (0.150)
PMR (index) −0.227∗ −0.126 −0.253∗∗∗ −0.252 −0.147
(0.133) (0.127) (0.055) (0.160) (0.155)
Output gap (%) −15.88∗∗∗ −19.43∗∗∗ −21.84∗∗∗ −20.84∗ −18.76
(5.658) (5.736) (3.259) (10.88) (12.23)
R2 (within) 0.291 0.243
R2 (overall) 0.042 0.132
R2 (between) 0.064 0.116
Hausman 0.291
OID test 0.046 0.367
AR(1) 0.039 0.029
AR(2) 0.329 0.771
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** sig-
nificant at 1%. All variables averaged over 5 year periods between 1971 - 2005 in order to
net out business cycle effects. Number of observations N=186 (77 countries, 5-year periods;
data averaged). Panel is strongly unbalanced due to missing observations (186 five year av-
erages available). Dependent variable is World development indicators total unemployment.
Data on labor and product market regulation from Fraser institute. All models control for
unobserved country- and period effects. FGLS allows for heteroscedastic errors. First lag
of dependent variable used for Feasible Least Square and Generalized Methods of Moments
regressions. Diff- and Sys-GMM estimators are valid if i) OID test does not reject the H0
(H0: overidentifying restrictions are valid) and ii) if test on AR(1) is positive and negative
on AR(2) (H0: no autocorrelation). Openness, output gap and LMR treated as endogenous
in the GMM regressions. Maximum number of lags used as instruments equals one (19
instruments for diff-GMM and 31 instruments for sys-GMM). Constant estimated but not
reported.
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and/or econometric speciﬁcation. Coeﬃcients pertaining to the dynamic Sys-GMM model
are long-run eﬀects.
Row i is a memo item and replicates information contained in Tables 1 and 2. Rows
ii and iii correspond to two separate regressions with real import openness and export
openness the interesting covariate. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of import openness in the non-
IV equation (−0.177) is algebraically larger than in the sys-GMM equation (−0.1), where
endogeneity concerns should be absent. In the case of export openness, the comparison
of coeﬃcients yields the opposite picture (−0.050 versus −0.138). The diﬀerence between
import and export openness is much smaller for the IV regressions than for the non-IV
ones. These results suggest that the endogeneity bias has opposite sign for imports and
exports: non-IV methods exaggerate the importance of imports on unemployment and
underestimate the role of exports. As discussed above, the reason may be that adverse
unemployment shocks trigger protectionist policy reactions that curb imports but boost
exports.
In the large cross-section, OLS estimates are probably more strongly aﬀected by mea-
surement bias, which is likely to be similar in importance across imports and exports, than
by endogeneity. The IV results show that estimated coeﬃcients diﬀer by less than the OLS
coeﬃcients and the bias is larger for imports than for exports. Hence, while this evidence
is weaker than for the OECD panel, it is still consistent with the view that endogeneity
biases are of opposite sign.
The lower panel in Table 4 shows results when export and import openness are simulta-
neously included into the same regression. Since the two variables are strongly correlated,
identiﬁcation of their partial eﬀects is diﬃcult. Moreover, in the case of the cross-section,
simultaneous instrumentation of exports and imports by very similar instruments yields
weak results. Across samples and methods, the estimates suggest that import openness
is more robustly related to the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The estimated sign
is usually negative, while it is positive for export openness.31 This is an interestingif
tentativeﬁnding. It is in line with the view that import competition weeds out ineﬃcient
ﬁrms, which strengthens average productivity and therefore lowers long-run unemploy-
ment, while additional export opportunities may reduce the bite of the selection eﬀect and
therefore shelter ineﬃcient ﬁrms. We present extensive robustness checks for these results
below.
31The large-panel is an exception. However, we do not want to emphasize this result due to the problems
discussed in section 4.1.3.
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Table 4: Exports versus imports
Dependent variable: Total unemployment (OECD and WDI)
Openness measure: Real openness (Alcala & Ciccone, 2004)
OECD panel Large cross section Large panel
———————————— ———————————— ————————————
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE/RE Sys-GMM OLS IV FE/RE Sys-GMM
i: Total trade −0.072∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.084∗
(0.018) (0.049) (0.028) (0.048) (0.020) (0.044)
Separate inclusion of import and export openness
ii: Import −0.177∗∗∗ −0.1∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ −0.078
(0.040) (0.054) (0.030) (0.052) (0.021) (0.055)
iii: Export −0.050∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.051) (0.026) (0.045) (0.064) (0.037)
Simultaneous inclusion of import and export openness
Import −0.244∗∗ −0.491 0.108 −0.871 −0.033 0.222
(0.075) (0.429) (0.185) (2.541) (0.067) (0.139)
Export 0.120∗ 0.344 −0.170 0.666 −0.043 −0.289∗∗
(0.056) (0.381) (0.162) (2.166) (0.061) (0.118)
In row i - iii, each cell represents one regression. For simultaneous import and export openness regressions,
we report coefficients for both measures in one column. Openness coefficients reported only. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. All
variables averaged over 5-year periods between 1980 - 2003 (OECD panel), 1971 - 2005 (large panel)
and over the whole period 1990 - 2006 (large cross section) to net out business cycles. Long-run effects
reported for sys-GMM regressions. Total unemployment rate (OECD and WDI) used as dependent
variable. An improved Frankel & Romer (1999) instrument used for the IV regressions. FE/RE: fixed
or random effects model selected according to Hausman test (Except for real import openness in the
OECD panel and real export openness in the large panel, RE preferred for all regressions). For further
details see Tables 1,2, and 3.
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5 Additional results
In this section we present a number of additional results. First, we explore the channels
through which openness aﬀects the equilibrium rate of unemployment. Second, we search
for interactions between openness and other variables, most importantly labor market
institutions. And third, we discuss a large array of robustness checks.
5.1 Through which channels does openness aﬀect unemployment?
In this section we scan potential channels through which openness might aﬀect unem-
ployment. We check Total Factor Productivity, capital to labor ratio, and various labor
and product market institutions for both, the OECD and the large cross section. Table
5 reports only the variables of interest. Full regression details can be found in the sup-
plement paper. The underlying models are similar to those presented in Tables 1 and 2
with the following modiﬁcations. In column (1) we regress the unemployment rate on the
respective channel variable, but do not include openness itself. All other covariates are
those presented in the benchmark models. In column (2) we use the channel variable as
the dependent variable and include an aggregate measure of trade openness into the list of
covariates. Column (3) reverts to the standard speciﬁcation with the rate of unemployment
as the dependent variable, but includes both openness and the respective channel variable
into the regression.
The role of TFP. We start with total factor productivity (TFP). In search-theoretic ex-
planations of equilibrium unemployment, it is possible that ﬁrms with higher productivity
ﬁnd it more attractive to post vacancies; see Epifania and Gancia (2005) or Felbermayr,
Prat and Schmerer (2008). In the latter example, more openness forces unproductive
ﬁrms to quit and allows more productive ones to expand. The average ﬁrm's productivity
increases, its revenue per match relative to the costs of vacancy creation goes up, and
so do its incentives to create jobs. Hence, increased openness leads to lower equilibrium
unemployment in the long-run through higher productivity.
For the OECD panel, we construct a proxy for TFP by following the procedure in Ben-
habib and Spiegel (2005), who apply the perpetual inventory method to back out estimates
for capital and then compute TFP as the Solow residual. We use the original estimates
published in Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) for the large cross-section. Column (1) in the
upper panel in Table 5 shows that countries with higher TFP have lower unemployment
rates.32 Note that this eﬀect cannot be driven by business cycle variation since we work
32Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) propose theoretical and empirical results on the relation between TFP
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with averages over 5-year averages, and we have included year dummies and a measure of
the output gap into the regressions. The eﬀect is fairly strong in the OECD panel: a one
percent increase in TFP lowers the equilibrium rate of unemployment by about 0.4 percent-
age points. Going from the sample mean of TFP to the highest realization, the decrease
in unemployment is about 7 percentage points. In the large cross-section, TFP is impor-
tant, too. A one percent increase in TFP lowers unemployment by about 0.04 percentage
points. However, due to greater variance of TFP measures in the larger cross-section,
moving from the sample mean to the highest realization of TFP yields an unemployment
reduction of about 2.8 percentage points. This eﬀect is fairly robust whenin the OECD
panelwe use alternative deﬁnitions of unemployment rates (youth unemployment, prime
age unemployment) orin the large cross-sectionunemployment data from ILO or the CIA
is used instead of that reported by the World Bank.
Column (2) in the ﬁrst panel shows the eﬀect of real openness on the log of TFP. The
results are broadly in line with Alcalá and Ciccone, who use a somewhat diﬀerent deﬁnition
of TFP for the year of 1985 in their cross-sectional analysis. Doubling real openness from
the sample mean (about 35 for the OECD panel and 30 in the large cross section) leads
to an increase in TFP by about 7 percent in the OECD panel and by about 24 percent in
the large cross-section.
Column (3) uses both, the log of TFP and real openness in the same unemployment
regression. In the OECD sample, the coeﬃcient on TFP turns out negative and statistically
signiﬁcant, with a coeﬃcient similar to the one estimated in column (1). The openness
measure is now insigniﬁcant, which is in contrast to our benchmark results presented
in Table 1. Hence, the eﬀect of openness goes through TFP, and there is no evidence
(even if the sign is correctly estimated) that openness directly lowers the equilibrium rate
of unemployment. In the large cross-section, the log of TFP and openness both turn
out insigniﬁcant, but a F-tests strongly rejects the Null that both coeﬃcients are jointly
zero. Our results therefore suggest that openness aﬀects unemployment mostly trough its
beneﬁcial eﬀect on TFP.
The role of factor proportions. Next, we ask whether openness aﬀects unemployment
through a capital accumulation eﬀect. The hypothesis is that a higher degree of openness
adds incentives for capital accumulation which could increase the marginal value product
of labor and thereby foster job creation. Indeed, in both samples, a higher capital to labor
ratio (K/L) turns out to be negatively related to equilibrium unemployment. There is no
evidence that trade openness boosts capital accumulation. Using openness andK/L jointly
in a single regression, we ﬁnd negative signs on both variables (in line with the hypothesis),
and unemployment that are consistent with our ﬁndings.
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Table 5: Through which channels does openness aﬀect unemployment?
Dependent variable: Total Unemployment (OECD and WDI), or ”channel variables”
Channel variables: TFP, K/L, Wage Distortion, PMR, EPL
Openness measure: Real openness (Alcala & Ciccone, 2004)
OECD panel Large cross section
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
FE/RE FE/RE FE/RE IV IV IV
I Dep. var. ⇒ u log TFP u u log TFPA) u
log TFP −31.419∗∗∗ −28.803∗∗∗ −4.231∗∗∗ −2.244
(7.484) (8.776) (1.471) (3.599)
Total trade openness 0.002∗∗ −0.023 0.008∗∗∗ −0.042
(real) (0.001) (0.025) (0.002) (0.067)
II Dep. var. ⇒ u K/L u u K/L u
K/L −0.560∗∗ −0.603∗∗∗ −0.438∗∗∗ −0.273∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.222) (0.151) (0.133)
Total trade openness −0.023 −0.075∗∗∗ 0.043 −0.089∗
(real) (0.018) (0.019) (0.043) (0.051)
III Dep. var. ⇒ u Wage dis. u u Wage dis.B) u
Wage Distortion 0.111∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 1.579 1.659
(0.026) (0.025) (1.611) (1.405)
Total trade openness −0.458∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.099∗∗
(real) (0.124) (0.018) (0.003) (0.048)
IV Dep. var. ⇒ u PMR u u PMRC) u
PMR 0.746 0.858∗ 0.329 0.028
(0.491) (0.463) (0.285) (0.338)
Total trade openness 0.010 −0.076∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.102∗∗
(real) (0.014) (0.018) (0.021) (0.047)
V Dep. var. ⇒ u EPL u u EPL u
EPL −0.642 −0.533 4.499 5.515∗∗
(0.541) (0.540) (2.745) (2.553)
Total trade openness 0.004 −0.072∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.099∗∗
(real) (0.007) (0.018) (0.002) (0.048)
Each column in each cell represents one regression. Openness and channel variable coefficients
reported only. As channel variables we use the capital to labor ratio, Total Factor Productivity,
Product Market Regulations and Labor Market Regulations. For the large sample we use A)
log TFP provided by Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), B) unemployment benefits as proxy for wage
distortion and C) PMR from the Fraser data base. In (1) we regress openness on unemployment,
in (2) we regress the channel variable on openness, and in (3) we regress openness and the
channel variable on unemployment. Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%,
** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. For the OECD panel we run benchmark type
fixed- random effects regressions. FE/RE: fixed or random effects model selected according to
Hausman test (RE preferred for all regressions with unemployment as dependent variable (1)
and (3) and FE preferred for all regressions where we use openness as dependent variable (2)).
For the large cross section we run benchmark type IV regressions. An improved Frankel &
Romer (1999) instrument used as instrument for the IV regressions.
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but relative to the benchmark results in Tables 1 and 2 the estimated openness coeﬃcients
are hardly aﬀected.
The role of institutions. One may conjecture that trade openness puts pressure on
policymakers to redesign institutions and policies such that they are more eﬃcient. In
columns (2) in panels III, IV, and V, we regress the degree of wage distortion, an index
of product market regulation (strongly related to the ﬁerceness of competition) and an
index of employment protection legislation (EPL) on real openness. Only in the case of
wage distortion and in the OECD panel do we ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect: openness reduces
the sum of replacement rate plus labor taxes such that a ten percentage point increase
in openness lowers the distortion by about 5 percentage points. The sign of the eﬀect is
negative in the large cross-section, but insigniﬁcant. There is no evidence that openness
lowers product market regulation.
We have conducted a number of robustness checks on Table 5 (see the supplement
paper) which conﬁrm that trade aﬀects unemployment through its eﬀect on TFP and
capital accumulation; other potential channels do not seem to matter.
5.2 Interaction terms
It is natural to investigate variables that condition the eﬀect of openness on the struc-
tural rate of unemployment. For example, the Heckscher-Ohlin model with search frictions
(Davidson and Matusz, 1999) predicts that trade liberalization should increase unemploy-
ment in capital-rich countries and reduce it in labor-abundant ones. Other models and the
political debate suggest that the eﬀect should depend on labor market institutions such
that countries with ineﬃcient institutions suﬀer from liberalization of international trade
while those with eﬃcient institutions beneﬁt. Table 6 includes a number of interaction
terms into our benchmark OECD panel, where Z is the conditioning variable, and T is
short-hand for trade openness. The table limits attention to the ﬁxed and random eﬀects
speciﬁcations, always reporting the speciﬁcation recommended by the Hausman test. It
does not report GMM estimates, which are problematic because of substantial uncertainty
about the correct lag structure in the instrument matrix. We report these results together
with the cross-sectional analysis in the supplement paper. In any case, diﬀerent methods
yield very similar results.
None of the interactions presented in Table 6 is statistically signiﬁcant. Column (1)
uses the aggregate capital-labor ratio; Heckscher-Ohlin arguments would suggest a positive
sign. The evidence conﬁrms the sign but the estimate is not distinguishable from zero. Dutt
et al. (2009) present a model and more extensive evidence on this point. Alternatively,
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Table 6: Do labor market institutions condition the eﬀect of openness on un-
employment (OECD panel)?
Dependent variable: Total unemployment (WDI)
Openness measure: Real openness (Alcala & Ciccone, 2004)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE/RE FE/RE FE/RE FE/RE FE/RE FE/RE FE/RE FE/RE
Interaction variable (Z) K/L TFP Replace. Tax High Union PMR EPL
rate wedge corp. density
Total trade openness (T ) −0.107∗∗ −0.102 −0.048 −0.097∗∗ −0.057 −0.125∗∗ −0.074∗∗ −0.065∗
(0.052) (0.580) (0.054) (0.046) (0.065) (0.055) (0.033) (0.037)
Z × T 0.035 0.266 −4.972 0.156 −0.797 0.148 0.266 0.001
(0.049) (2.101) (13.438) (0.155) (5.286) (0.127) (0.981) (0.238)
Z −0.081∗∗∗ −23.442∗ 0.059 0.188∗∗ −0.706 −0.069 0.807 −1.464
(0.030) (13.969) (0.047) (0.075) (1.562) (0.051) (0.617) (1.027)
Observations 95 95 100 100 100 100 100 100
R2 (within) 0.669 0.659 0.661 0.665 0.662 0.667 0.662 0.661
R2 (overall) 0.577 0.557 0.418 0.419 0.413 0.431 0.412 0.327
R2 (between) 0.547 0.540 0.329 0.329 0.322 0.344 0.320 0.416
Each column represents one regression. Openness coefficients, interaction and respective interaction variable reported only. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. FE/RE: fixed or random effects
model selected according to Hausman test (RE preferred for all regressions). PMR denotes product market regulations and EPL
denotes employment protection legislation.
1
one may argue that high productivity countries beneﬁt from trade liberalization while less
productive ones suﬀer. This hypothesis does not bear out in the data, neither. Columns
(3) to (8) use interactions of institutional variables such as the replacement rate, the tax
wedge, the degree of corporatism, union density, product market regulation (PMR), or
the degree of employment protection legislation (EPL). Standard errors to the estimated
eﬀects are always very high, so that we cannot reject the Null that all these conditioning
eﬀects are statistically irrelevant.
5.3 Additional robustness checks.
In this section, we report a number of robustness checks whose details are reported in the
supplement paper.
Alternative openness measures. In the main body of this paper, we use the real
openness measure of Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) as our preferred indicator of trade openness.
We have seen that the eﬀect of trade on unemployment is likely to run through improved
aggregate productivity. Since productivity changes are likely to have a sector bias, we
have to care about the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect. The measure of real openness accounts
for this. Nonetheless, the growth-openness literature uses an uncorrected measure that we
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call current price openness (Alcalá and Ciccone use the term openness tout court).33
The upper part of Table 7 reports results for diﬀerent openness measures. The focus
is on current price openness. Only openness coeﬃcients and their standard errors are
reported; details are relegated to the supplement paper. We look at the OECD panel,
the large cross-section, and the large panel and compare models that control for endo-
geneity and those that do not. The upper panel uses either total openness or export or
import openness separately in the regressions. We also try the constant price openness
measure reported in the Penn World Tables and an indicator that draws only on mer-
chandise trade (i.e, excluding services). Across all these speciﬁcations, we do not ﬁnd a
single positive coeﬃcient. Coeﬃcient estimates are often algebraically bigger than in our
benchmark results, so that the choice of the openness measure does have an inﬂuence on
the quantitative interpretation of results. Some of the coeﬃcients from the large panel are
insigniﬁcant statistically, but for reasons detailed above we do not want to over emphasize
these ﬁndings. Hence, we conﬁrm our general conclusion that openness certainly does not
increase unemployment in the long-run. Comparing with the results reported in Table 4,
we ﬁnd that the real openness measure performs better in terms of stability of coeﬃcients
across speciﬁcations. Discrepancies between export and import openness measures are also
smaller so that the robustness checks conﬁrm the superiority of the real openness indicator
over alternative options.
Log unemployment. There is no apparent consensus in the labor market literature as
to whether unemployment regressions have to be run with the dependent variable in logs
or in levels. Almost all equations discussed in Bassanini and Duval (2009) are in levels;
the recent paper by Costain and Reiter (2008) uses logs. In the present setup, results are
largely independent of this choice, as can be seen from the middle part of Table 7, where we
keep estimation strategies and samples identical to those used in the upper part but just
use the log of unemployment as the dependent variable. While signiﬁcance of the openness
coeﬃcient may be lost in some cases, there is no evidencenot in a single regressionthat
openness increases unemployment in the long run.
Alternative unemployment measures and data sources. Our benchmark regres-
sions use total unemployment rates provided by the OECD, and in the larger samples, data
reported by the World Bank in their World Indicator Data base. There are substantial
concerns about data quality, in particular in samples that include developing countries.
Moreover, even OECD countries have very diﬀerent approaches to dealing with employ-
ment issues for workers at the start or the end of their professional careers. We deal with
33See section 2.1.2 for a more detailed discussion of diﬀerent openness measures.
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this problem by running our regressions using alternative unemployment measures.
For the OECD we substitute the total unemployment rate by prime age and youth
unemployment but use the Alcalá and Ciccone real openness measure.
Table 7: Robustness checks
Dependent variable: Total unemployment (OECD and WDI)
OECD panel Large cross section Large panel
———————————— ———————————— ————————————
Openness measure ⇓ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE/RE Sys-GMM OLS IV FE/RE Sys-GMM
Current price openness
i: Total trade −0.059∗∗ −0.235∗∗ −0.026 −0.123∗ −0.032∗∗ −0.054
(0.023) (0.116) (0.017) (0.066) (0.014) (0.036)
ii: Import −0.081∗∗∗ −0.257∗∗ −0.023 −0.140∗ −0.029∗∗ −0.03
(0.027) (0.116) (0.019) (0.077) (0.014) (0.042)
iii: Export −0.039∗ −0.183∗ −0.028∗ −0.110∗ −0.032∗∗ −0.074∗∗
(0.021) (0.101) (0.016) (0.057) (0.013) (0.032)
Constant price openness
iv: Total trade −0.078∗∗∗ −0.132∗ −0.027 −0.130∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.039
(0.018) (0.074) (0.018) (0.072) (0.015) (0.036)
Merchandize trade openness
v: Total trade −0.046 −0.187∗∗ −0.013 −0.073∗ −0.029∗∗ −0.065∗
(0.034) (0.09) (0.010) (0.040) (0.014) (0.035)
Log total unemployment and real total trade openness
vi: Total trade −0.006∗∗ −0.014∗ −0.009∗∗ −0.009∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.008
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Dependent variable: Prime/youth unemployment, total unemployment CIA/IFS/ILO definition
Openness measure: Real total trade openness (Alcala & Ciccone, 2004)
Sys-GMM Sys-GMM IV IV Sys-GMM Sys-GMM
Unemployment rate Prime Youth CIA IFS ILO IFS
vii: Total trade −0.174∗∗ −0.146 −0.166∗∗ −0.083∗ −0.104∗∗ −0.096∗∗
(0.068) (0.130) (0.067) (0.045) (0.049) (0.041)
In row i - vii, each cell represents one regression. Openness coefficients reported only. Robust standard errors
in parentheses, *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. All variables averaged over
5-year periods between 1980 - 2003 (OECD panel), 1971 - 2005 (large panel) and over the whole period 1990 -
2006 (large cross section) to net out business cycles. Long-run effects reported for sys-GMM regressions. Total
unemployment rate (OECD and WDI) used as dependent variable in row i - iv. In row vi we use prime age,
youth, CIA, IFS, and ILO data for total unemployment. In row vii we use the respective ln unemployment
variable. Current price openness measures used in row i - iii, constant price openness in row iv, merchandize
in row v and real total trade openness in row vi and vii. An improved Frankel & Romer (1999) instrument
used for the IV regressions. FE/RE: fixed or random effects model selected according to Hausman test (RE is
preferred for all regressions). For further details see Tables 1,2, and 3.
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The ﬁrst two columns in the lower part of 7 show sys-GMM estimates. For prime
age unemployment openness has a stronger eﬀect than for youth unemployment and is
only marginally signiﬁcant in the latter case. This is not overly surprising because youth
unemployment is probably much more strongly related to institutional features of labor
markets rather than to the extent of trade openness.
The remaining columns in the lower part of 7 report results for the larger cross-section
and then for the larger panel, but use unemployment data from alternative data sources.
Most importantly, data from the CIA leads to a much stronger eﬀect of openness on the
structural rate of unemployment. This is a robust ﬁnding, for which we present more
evidence in the supplement paper. The other data sources also yield negative coeﬃcients
that are of similar size to those obtained with our preferred data base, the WDI.
6 Conclusion
This paper establishes an empirical regularity: trade openness does not increase structural
unemployment in the long run. Quite to the contrary, in most of our regressions, we ﬁnd
overwhelming evidence for a beneﬁcial eﬀect. This ﬁnding is robust to the choice of sample,
estimation strategy, and does not hinge on our particular choice of openness measure or
the deﬁnition of the unemployment rate.
Our analysis draws on two long-standing research traditions: panel unemployment
regressions for OECD countries, recently summarized by Nickel et al. (2005), and cross-
sectional analysis of the eﬀect of trade liberalization pioneered by Frankel and Romer
(1999). In all cases, we average our data and use information on the output gap in order to
control for business cycle eﬀects. We include a large host of institutional variables and of
geographical controls related to the importance of domestic as compared to international
trade. Whenever possible, we include country and year eﬀects. We deal with the possible
endogeneity of openness either by exploiting the time dimension of the data or by using the
geography-based instrumentation strategy developed by Frankel and Romer (1999). All of
our diﬀerent approaches have advantages and drawbacks. However, the picture across all
models is fairly stable and robust. Moreover, we have suﬃcient evidence to conclude that
openness is causally related to lower unemployment.
We conjecture that the endogeneity bias has a diﬀerent sign for imports than for exports
so that the non-instrumented regressions bias the openness coeﬃcient away from zero in
the case of import openness and towards zero in the case of export openness. The reason
is that policy-makers may resort to export-promoting and import-hindering policies when
an economy is hit by an adverse unemployment shock. We ﬁnd evidence for exactly this
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structure, which lends external credibility to our instrumentation strategy.
Our benchmark regressions make use of the Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) measure of real
openness. This indicator is closely related to the usual ratio of exports plus imports over
GDP, but corrects for cross-sector diﬀerences in rates of technological change, thereby
dealing with the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect. That correction is important in the present
context, since the data suggests that openness aﬀects unemployment mainly through its
beneﬁcial impact on factor productivity.
Our results are therefore in line with theoretical work that points towards a negative
eﬀect of trade liberalization on the structural rate of unemployment. Models of this type
are presented in Dutt et al. (2009) or in Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2008). The recent
work by Helpman, Itshoki, and Redding (2008) is also compatible with the evidence.
Finally, it is worth noting that the present paper has a focus on long-run eﬀects. We
pay special attention to netting out business cycle disturbances. In this sense, our work is
complementary to a growing number of empirical papers on the short-run implications of
trade liberalization for labor markets.
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A Data description and summary statistics
A.1 Unemployment rates
Table 8: Unemployment rates according to diﬀerent sources
Unemployment rate ratio
Year Sample (average) CIA / ILO
WDI ILO CIA Avg. Median
1990 Full (N=48) 7.74 7.79 9.69 1.29 1.16
OECD 20 6.90 6.88 7.02 1.07 1.00
RoW 8.16 8.24 11.03 1.40 1.18
1995 Full (N=68) 8.69 9.00 9.64 1.16 1.10
OECD 20 8.74 8.75 10.39 1.22 1.17
RoW 8.68 9.10 9.34 1.13 1.08
2000 Full (N=77) 9.06 9.43 10.88 1.39 1.02
OECD 20 6.15 6.13 6.73 1.09 1.03
RoW 10.09 10.59 12.34 1.50 1.02
2005 Full (N=69) 8.94 8.94 9.89 1.15 1.07
OECD 20 6.39 6.34 6.63 1.04 1.03
RoW 9.98 9.99 11.23 1.20 1.08
Data sources: CIA (Central Intelligence Agency); ILO (International Labor
Organization), WDI (World Development Indicators, World Bank).
OECD20 sample includes the 20 OECD countries used in Bassanini &
Duval (2009) and in our panel regressions.
Countries included: AlbaniaC , ArgentinaBC , AustraliaABC , AustriaABC , BelgiumABC , BoliviaBC ,
BrazilBC , BulgariaBC , CanadaABC , ChileBC , ChinaBC , ColombiaBC , Costa RicaC , CroatiaBC , Czech
RepublicBC , DenmarkABC , Dominican Rep.BC , EcuadorBC , EgyptBC , El SalvadorC , EstoniaC , FinlandABC ,
FranceABC , GermanyABC , GeorgiaC , GreeceBC , GuatemalaC , HondurasC , Hong KongBC , HungaryBC ,
IcelandC , IndonesiaBC , IrelandABC , IsraelBC , ItalyABC , JamaicaBC , JapanABC , JordanC , KazakstanB ,
KoreaBC , KuwaitC , LatviaBC , LithuaniaBC , MalaysiaBC , MauritiusC , MexicoBC , MoldovaC , MoroccoBC ,
NetherlandsABC , New ZealandABC , NicaraguaC , NorwayABC , PakistanBC , PanamaBC , ParaguayC , PeruBC ,
PhilippinesBC , PolandBC , PortugalABC , RomaniaBC , Russian FederationBC , SingaporeBC , Slovak RepublicBC ,
SloveniaBC , South AfricaBC , SpainABC , Sri LankaBC , SwedenABC , SyriaC , SwitzerlandABC , ThailandBC ,
TunisiaC , TurkeyBC , UkraineBC , United KingdomABC , United StatesABC , UruguayBC , VenezuelaBC .
A: included in the OECD sample, B: included in the large cross section, C: included in the large panel.
A.2 OECD sample
Unemployment rates (U) For our OECD benchmark regressions we use total unemployment,
measuring the percentage share of unemployed workers in toad labor force (15 - 66 years old individuals).
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Data taken from Basanini and Duval. Original Source: OECD, Database on Labour Force Statistics;
OECD, Annual Labour Force Statistics.
Openness measures (T) Total trade openness is deﬁned as imports plus exports divided by two
times GDP in current prices. Real openness measures are constructed as respective current price openness
measure times price level (taken from the Penn World Table 6.2) in order to accounts for the Balassa
Samuelson eﬀect by using real purchasing power GDP as denominator. Open (merchandise) excludes
services, taken from the WDI data base and constant price openness taken from the Penn World Table
6.2.
Wage distortion Wage distortion lumps replacement rate and tax wedge together. Both variables
aﬀect unemployment through the same channel, namely wages.Therefore lumping both variables together
further reduces the number of instruments when estimating GMM regressions.
Replacement rate Average unemployment beneﬁts taken from the Basanini and Duval data set.
Original source: OECD Beneﬁts and Wages Database. According to Basanini and Duval data is available
for odd years only, so that they ﬁlled the gaps by linear interpolation.
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Tax wedge This variable measures taxation on wages by computing the diﬀerence between wages paid
by employers and wages earned by employees. The variable on tax wedge is build on the OECD taxing
wages data. Some observations were adjusted by B&D in order to ﬁll the gaps in the data, thus providing
a complete sample for the period 1982 - 2003.
Union density Union density measures the percentage share of workers associated to unions. Ac-
cording to B&D the data was taken from the OECD Employment Outlook 2004 and inter / extrapolated
in order to maximize the sample.
High corporatism Dummy variable that takes the value one if wage bargaining is highly centralized.
Source: Basanini and Duval.
EPL Measures the stringency of employment protection legislation, taken from Basanini and Duval.
Original source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2004.
PMR Measures the regulation on product markets and competition, taken from Basanini and Duval.
Original source: Conway et al. (2006).
Total factor productivity (TFP) We construct total factor productivity according to Benhabib
and Spiegel (2004) as Solow residual. We assume that GDP is produced according to a Cobb Douglas
production function and obtain the Solow residual as diﬀerence between ln GDP and ln labor as well as
ln capital input. For the Cobb Douglas input shares we use standardized values.
Capital to labor ratio (K/L) The capital to labor ratio is constructed according to Benhabib
and Spiegel (2005). Capital is the sum of discounted initial capital, discounted and inherited capital from
the lagged periods, and investment made in the respective period. For labor we use data on population as
a proxy. We use Penn World Table 6.2 data for population, investment and GDP.
Output gap Output gap measures the diﬀerence between actual and potential GDP as percentage
of potential output. As source B&D cite the OECD Economic outlook and IMF International ﬁnance
statistics.
A.3 Large global cross country sample
Unemployment rate (U) We use three diﬀerent sources for total unemployment: The World
Developing Indicators mainly provide oﬃcial estimates on unemployment and are used as benchmark.
Average unemployment rates constructed with less than 10 observations dropped. For additional robustness
checks we include unemployment rates taken from the CIA factbook and IFS data base.
Openness measures (T) See OECD sample data description for further details.
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Frankel and Romer instrument (F&R) Our improved Frankel and Romer instrument bilat-
eral trade data was used to regress total trade (exports plus imports) between country i and j, normalized
by country i′s GDP, on geographical determinants of trade. The standard procedure is to take logs and
estimate using OLS. Since Tij = 0 for many country pairs, we follow Santos and Tenreyro (2006) and
estimate (3) using Poisson pseudo maximum-likelihood. Predicting Tˆij and summing over j, we have a
measure of the trade share Tˆi that is by construction orthogonal to unemployment and hence a valid
instrument.
EPL Employment laws index measuring the protection of labor and employment (EPL). The index
variable includes: 1) Alternative employment contracts, 2) cost of increasing hours worked, 3) cost of ﬁring
workers and 4) dismissal procedures. Source: Botero et al. (2004).
Unemployment beneﬁts Unemployment beneﬁts is an index variable taken from Botero et al.
(2004), including: 1) time of employment needed to qualify for unemployment beneﬁts, 2) percentage
of workers monthly income, paid to ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts, 3) waiting time on unemployment
beneﬁts, 4) percentage of income covered by unemployment beneﬁts in case of a one year unemployment
spell.
Minimum wage Dummy variable which takes the value one if there are binding minimum wages in
the respective economy, taken from Botero et al. (2004).
Latitude Measures the distance between a country's capital and the equator. Data taken from the
CIA factbook.
Area We control for the size of the economy in terms of its log area.
Land lockedness Land lockedness is constructed as index, measuring the length of neighboring
borders relative to total length of borders.
Population We use Penn World Table 6.2 data on the size of population and take logs.
Unoﬃcial economy This variable measures the size of the shadow economy, taken from Botero et
al. (2004).
Total factor productivity (TFP) We use the original log TFP data provided by Benhabib and
Spiegel (2005), constructed as diﬀerence between log GDP and log capital, as well as log labor input.
Capital to labor ratio (K/L) See OECD data description for further details.
Output gap We construct output gap as diﬀerence between ln GDP and ln trend GDP, where the
latter one is constructed by HP ﬁltering the GDP data with smoothing factor 400. GDP is constructed as
real GDP per capita (chain) times population taken from the Penn World Table 6.2.
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A.4 Large panel
Unemployment rates (U) See large cross section for further details. We also use unemployment
rates from the ILO Laborsta database for robustness checks.
Openness measures See OECD data description for further details.
Labor market regulations (LMR) An index variable capturing labor market regulations. This
index contains information on minimum wages, mandated hiring costs, unemployment beneﬁts and other
variables. Notice that higher index values indicate more freedom and thus lower labor market regulations.
Higher values indicate more freedom in terms of less regulation. Between 1975 and 2000 data was estimated
in 5-year intervals. From 2000 till 2006 yearly data is available. Source: Fraser Freedom of the World data
set, 2008. Recoded by multiplying with −1.
Unemployment beneﬁts Higher values indicate more freedom in terms of less regulation. Source:
Fraser Freedom of the World Data set, 2008. Recoded by multiplying with −1.
Product market regulations (PMR) Taken from the Fraser freedom of the world database.
We use price control as proxy for product market regulations. Higher values indicate more freedom in
terms of less regulation. Source: Fraser Freedom of the World data set, 2008. Recoded by multiplying
with −1.
Output gap See large cross section data description for more details.
Population See large cross section data description for more details.
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